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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OFFICE/POST.....C.R.....

FILE No. 193/11/128

PART No. 1

FULL TITLE

IRAN: RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

BAR CODE LABEL

Section

Date commenced

30.9.70

Date finished

10.3.79

Previous papers

Subsequent papers

Archival action

RELATED FILES

ABSTRACT OF TITLE

[illegible]

BAR CODE LABEL

FILE No. 193/11/28
PART No. 1

14604/84

C. J. THOMPSON, Commonwealth Government Printer

SECRET

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 193/11/128 PART 1

Department of Foreign Affairs

RE8.

File Number 193/11/128
Part Number 1

**FILE
CLOSED**

This part opened on 30 9 70

This part closed on 10 3 79

Subsequent correspondence on Part/File Number.....

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

→ 193/11/128

FILE No. ~~143/11~~

DATE 10/3/79 175/1/31

FOR

SUBJECT IRAN: Saudi Arabia and Israel

Re: Mr. Jackson

This is a useful paper prepared by

Mr. Bright. Do you wish it to go

forward as an ^{yes?} information submission to

Committee? or part of an "International

^{no?} "Issues" paper and which publication
would like to have an Iran? or B.C.?

Lehmann

to Bright 27/3

As discuss with CSA. Have
re typed
f.

DRAFT

IRAN - IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

South Africa

Bahstian
The Bahstian and, later, the Bazargan Governments both announced that they were breaking off all ties with the South African and Israeli Governments. // It was not until late 1970 that the two countries exchanged missions. Because of Iran's need to preserve its good standing amongst Third World countries, relations were established at consular and not at full diplomatic level although in fact the missions were staffed by diplomats. South African exports to Iran were mainly agricultural products but included a large but undisclosed quantity of uranium. Iran was also contemplating investing in a South African enrichment plant and there was an exchange of nuclear information and technical expertise. In addition to nuclear cooperation, there was also defence cooperation springing, perhaps, from their common interests as anti-communist states bordering the Indian Ocean. Iran stands to lose little by breaking its links with South Africa particularly now that it has decided to curtail both its nuclear and military procurement programs and to restrict imports of agricultural products. Australia might gain by being able to fill any vacuum left by South Africa in sales of agricultural products and uranium.

From the South African point of view, the break is much more serious but not disastrous. South Africa used to import about 90% of its oil from Iran. The rest has come indirectly via Mozambique and Singapore. However, South Africa has stockpiled about two and a half year's supply of oil (four year's supply if rationed), by 1980/81 an oil from coal plant which could provide 25% of oil needs will be on stream and South Africa should be able to find in the foreseeable

future new, albeit more expensive, sources of oil supply. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha ^{reportedly} made three secret visits to Saudi Arabia last year and there are reports that some of the oil entering South Africa via Mozambique is of Saudi origin. If South African can find alternative sources of supply, as seems likely, it should be able to ride out any immediate difficulties.

ISRAEL

Iran opened a consulate in Tel Aviv in April 1950 but, under Prime Minister Mossadeq, closed it in July 1951. Nevertheless, exchanges of businessmen and journalists continued and, until the change of government, Israel maintained a mission in Tehran which was not called an embassy or listed in the Diplomatic List but in fact operated as one. The PLO has now taken over the offices formerly used by the Israelis. Israeli interests are now handled by an Israeli interest section of the Canadian Embassy.

Israel's exports to Iran, mainly electronic equipment, building materials and oranges, rose steadily in recent years and reached a value of about \$100 million in 1978. In addition, Israel sold Iran a certain amount of light ammunition and small arms like the "Uzi".

There has also been defence, security intelligence, and, possibly, nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Iranian officers have had training in Israel. It is widely acknowledged that Israel's intelligence organisation cooperated with the US Central Intelligence Agency in re-establishing

../3

Savak, Iran's powerful State Security Service, in the early 1960s. The last Israeli head of mission in Tehran, Mr Harmelin, was a former chief of Israel's "M15". Savak has now been disbanded and there must be some concern as to who now has access to the security information passed on by Israel. There is no hard information on the extent of Iranian/Israeli nuclear cooperation. Publicly, the Israeli government does not appear to be unduly concerned at the loss of its oil supplies from Iran (about 50% of total oil imports). One Israeli oil ministry official has commented to the press "There is no question about how much oil we get - just a problem of what price we pay". Israel is no doubt relying on the US promise (as part of the 1975 Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement) to make up any shortfall as well as its own ability to negotiate secret agreements with other suppliers.

However, any increase in direct US supplies of oil (or supplies from other countries arranged by the US) will increase US potential leverage over Israel. At least in the short term, this is likely to make Israel more suspicious of *US peace proposals which it will see as attempts by the* US to exert undue pressure. Self-reliance has been a basic *tenet* of Israeli policy and Israel can be expected to react defensively to any suspicion that its independence is threatened.

Israel can also be expected to use the return of its oil fields in the Sinai to Egypt as a stronger bargaining chip in the Middle East peace negotiations. In a discussion with the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 February, our Ambassador in Tel Aviv gained the impression that Israel was not looking for the status of a preferred customer or other guarantees to ensure access to Sinai oil but rather was seeking guarantees, presumably from USA, to secure alternative sourcing for its future oil needs.

.. /4

Although the new government in Iran has adopted a staunchly pro-PLO policy, we would not expect it to assist Israel's opponents with more than money and some weapons. Iranians as a whole do not like Arabs and Iran is no more likely to commit troops against Israel than Turkey or Pakistan. The PLO has no great need for weapons or money and so Iran's new policy is unlikely to affect significantly the military balance vis-a-vis Israel.

A more likely effect of the changes in Iranian policy should be a strengthening of Yasser Arafat's personal position as Chairman of the PLO. Syria has long wanted to replace Arafat with Zuheir Mohsen, leader of the Syrian-backed Palestinians group Saiga, and Arafat has had to rely on support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to stay in power. Support from Iran will lessen the PLO's reliance on Syria and so increase Arafat's and the PLO's freedom of movement.

193/11/128

Iran/South Africa relations

The Iranian Government announced on 4 March the severing of relations with South Africa and asked the South African Consul-General in Tehran, General Fraser, to leave. The statement said the Government considered the apartheid policy contrary to human rights. An earlier Government announcement had said that Iran would no longer supply oil to South Africa and the latest move to cut all relations including apparently commercial links represents a hardening of the Government's position.

A close relationship with South Africa had developed during the Shah's regime, although in deference to Third World opinion it had not been given full diplomatic status. As well as a thriving trade relationship there were defence and nuclear contacts. The Shah felt a sentimental attachment towards South Africa, where his father was exiled and eventually died in 1944, and this would have provided a further motivation for the present Government to sever the relationship.

Mr Scholtz

Mr Bragg

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

(F)

193/11/128

O.TR8007 DB3/JJ
TOR 0119 6.3.79

O.TR8007 1500 5.3.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/7265

RP.
RR PRETORIA/009

FM. TEHRAN / FILE 221/5/41

R E S T R I C T E D

IRAN/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THE SEVERING OF RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND ASKED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUL-GENERAL HERE, GENERAL FRASER TO LEAVE. THE STATEMENT SAID THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE APARTHEID POLICY CONTRARY TO HUMAN RIGHTS. AN EARLIER GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT HAD SAID THAT IRAN WOULD NO LONGER SUPPLY OIL TO SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LATEST MOVE TO CUT ALL RELATIONS INCLUDING APPARENTLY COMMERCIAL LINKS REPRESENTS A HARDENING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

2. A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA HAD DEVELOPED DURING THE SHAH'S REGIME ALTHOUGH IN DEFERENCE TO THIRD WORLD OPINION IT HAD NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN GIVEN FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS. THE RELATIONSHIP INCLUDED DEFENCE COOPERATION AS WELL AS A THRIVING TRADE. SOUTH AFRICA WAS EXPECTING TO PROVIDE URANIUM FOR IRAN'S AMBITIOUS ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM BUT THIS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT IN ANY CASE NOW BE PROCEEDED WITH. THE SHAH FELT A SENTIMENTAL ATTACHMENT TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA WHERE HIS FATHER WAS EXILED AND EVENTUALLY DIED IN 1944 AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE A FURTHER MOTIVATION FOR THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO SEVERE THE RELATIONSHIP.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN + DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - 0. TR8007

RESTRICTED

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ACTION: AME

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	ANZ
EUR	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	FAS(PCR)	INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	FAREP(SMP)			
ADAB(DIR)							

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CENTRAL

DATE. 5 June 1978

INFORMATION. PRETORIA

IN REPLY
QUOTE

M.TRO246

REGISTRY
CODE

TO. CANBERRA

INWARDS

REF. M.

TO FILE.

193/11/128

FM. TEHRAN

CLASSIFICATION. CONFIDENTIAL

FM. FILE. 221/5/41

POST
SEQUENCE
NUMBER

PSN.116

SUBJECT. IRAN : RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA


Despite the Shah's well publicised opposition to the minority white regimes of southern Africa, his administration has a close working commercial and, on some levels, political relationship with the Government of South Africa. This curious and obscure relationship has put the Shah in line for criticism from the extreme left of the Third World but has otherwise not damaged the Shah's carefully guarded position among the more moderate Third World leaders.

2. The origins of Iranian ties with South Africa are largely emotional. When the Shah's father, Reza Shah the Great, was forced into abdication and exile during World War II he went to Johannesburg and, eventually, died there. But it was not until late 1970 that Iran and South Africa exchanged missions and the primary reason for establishing representation was the growing commercial relations between the two countries.

3. Because of Iran's need to preserve its good standing amongst the Third World countries, relations with South Africa were institutionalised at a consular and not at a full diplomatic level. Iran opened a consulate-general in Johannesburg while South Africa opened a similar mission in Tehran. However, it is generally acknowledged that the South African mission functions as a diplomatic post and its Consul-General holds the career rank of ambassador.

4. The commercial relationship between the two countries has been a steadily growing one as Table I (see below) indicates. According to the South African Consulate-General the major exports to Iran are agricultural products and semi-finished materials such

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- 1) ~~Review~~ - a useful memo.
- 2) Com. W/CSA, esp. Nuclear Safeguards.
- 3) File. - sent.

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timber. Recently, automobiles have joined the list as Iran has purchased South African assembled BMWs. There have also been rumours in Tehran that South Africa is now exporting live animals for eventual slaughtering in Iran. The South African Consulate-General, however, has no knowledge of such exports. Curiously the Consulate-General's breakdowns of aggregate trade figures are "restricted" and not released to either the public or other diplomatic missions. Whether this is designed to hide trade in particularly controversial commodities, such as uranium, is a matter of conjecture.

TABLE I : IRAN'S TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

<u>Year</u>	<u>Non-oil Exports</u> (Rials million)	<u>Percentage of</u> <u>Total Non-oil</u> <u>Exports</u>	<u>Ranking in List</u> <u>of Trade Partners</u> (4)
2532 (1)	966	2.22	9
2534 (2)	436	1.07	23
2536 (First quarter) (3)	251	3.15	10

<u>Year</u>	<u>Imports</u> (Rials million)	<u>Percentage of</u> <u>Total Imports</u>	<u>Ranking in List</u> <u>of Trade Partners</u> (4)
2532 (1)	2,434	0.96	17
2534 (2)	4,315	0.54	20
2536 (First quarter) (3)	3,169	1.21	14

Notes:

- (1) 21 March 1973 to 20 March 1974.
- (2) 21 March 1975 to 20 March 1976.
- (3) 21 March 1977 to 22 June 1977.
- (4) Trading partners ranked according to volume of exports/imports.

Source: Iran Customs Administration Statistics.

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5. For South Africa the obvious predominant commercial interest is oil - Iran is South Africa's major supplier. This heavy reliance on Iran puts South Africa into a position whereby certain restrictions are placed on the use of Iranian oil. For example, since mid-1977 South Africa has been bound by a written agreement which stipulates that it will not pass "a single drop" of Iranian oil on to Rhodesia. Iran had demanded this as a result of allegations that Iran was indirectly selling oil to Rhodesia via South Africa. There has also been speculation that the US and Britain were willing to bring pressure to bear on South Africa with regard to questions like Rhodesia and Namibia via Iran's use of the oil weapon. However, even if Iran was willing to use oil as a weapon (and the Shah repeatedly claims that it is not) using it against South Africa would be likely to damage some Iranian interests. For example, Iran supplies more than 12 million tons of crude oil per year for refining at an Irano-South African joint venture plant near Johannesburg.

6. But it is South African uranium that really limits Iran's ability to bludgeon Mr Vorster's much criticised Government into a more acceptable international stance. There has been speculation since 1975 that Iran sees South Africa as a major source of uranium to power the Shah's ambitious nuclear energy program. The Washington Post reported on 12 October 1975 that Iran was about to sign an agreement to buy 14,000 tons of uranium oxide from South Africa. Similar reports claimed that Iran was also contemplating investment in South African enrichment plants. A recent US Senate paper (Fern Racin Gold and Malcolm A. Conant, Access to Oil - the United States' Relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources) reported that Iran had apparently found a way around US concern regarding "the proliferation potential of national enrichment facilities" by investing in enrichment facilities outside Iran in South Africa and Europe (through Eurodif and Coredif).

7. All such reports are forthrightly denied by the South African Consulate-General in Tehran. However, the prospect of future sales of uranium to Iran is not denied so readily. Moreover, the Consulate-General acknowledges that there is an exchange of information and technical expertise taking place, including the training of Iranian nuclear technicians in South Africa and frequent visits to Iran by South African experts. Significantly, the US Embassy in Tehran maintains that South African uranium sales to Iran are "definitely on".

8. The shrouding of uranium trade in secrecy indicates that both South Africa and Iran are well aware of the political controversy that would accompany public acknowledgment of such a relationship. This and the Shah's posture

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as a Third World leader makes the political relationship between Iran and South Africa blatantly two-faced. The Shah and his Ministers constantly criticise South Africa: the usual line is that it is essential that the discrimination inherent in apartheid be brought to an end, that the South African black majority be given a greater voice in running its affairs and that a more equal distribution of economic and political rights becomes the centre piece of South African policy. However, the Shah's statements apparently do not affect relations with South Africa as long as his well-worn "trade with anybody" policy survives. According to the South African Consulate-General in Tehran, the South African Government fully realises that the Shah must give due deference to his standing in the Third World and that deference includes periodic criticism of the white regimes in southern Africa.

9. Despite the Shah's public stand on southern Africa, Iran and South Africa do have a common strategic interest as anti-communist states bordering the Indian Ocean. Both are vehemently opposed to the extension of Soviet influence in Africa (either directly or through its Cuban allies). This has led to considerable speculation that defence cooperation looms high on the agenda of Iran's relations with South Africa. There have even been suggestions that arms sales may have taken place and, curiously, the current South African Consul-General in Tehran is a former army officer. The South African Consulate-General in Tehran acknowledges that defence cooperation between the two countries is important to both Iran and South Africa but declines to detail just what cooperation involves.

10. The group of countries Iran would be most likely to offend by freely acknowledging the controversial uranium and defence links with South Africa are undoubtedly the more radical of the emerging states of Africa. Iran has been relatively successful in keeping on the good side of conservative black African states - Senegal is a very obvious example - and has generally avoided antagonising the more radical African leaders. A notable exception, however, has been one of the radical Arab states - Libya. In his opening address to the Organisation for African Unity Council of Ministers in Tripoli on 3 April 1978, Colonel Qadhafi said that Iran's present support for the racist regimes of southern Africa must be stopped. Nevertheless, the Shah has not closed his country to some of the more radical black African leaders. For example, Mr Joshua Nkomo, co-leader of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, has visited Tehran several times. His last visit was during April 1978 when he

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CONFIDENTIAL

exchanged views with Iranian officials about the situation in Rhodesia and requested assistance from Iran in his campaign against Mr Smith's Rhodesian Government. Significantly, Iran does not support Mr Smith's "internal settlement" plan. Shrewdly, the Shah hopes to keep on good terms with as broad a spectrum of African leaders as possible even if the visibility of ties with South Africa and Iran's staunch Western alignment make some of the more radical leaders suspicious.

11. This survey of Iran's relations with South Africa leads to three observations:

- (i) Very little is known of the details of either the commercial or the political relationship;
- (ii) Even less is publicly acknowledged by either country; and
- (iii) Both governments are quite content to keep it that way.

As the relationship broadens and matures it will become increasingly difficult for Iran to continue avoiding criticism from its Third World neighbours, but South Africa has a definite interest in helping Iran to continue developing the relationship. South Africa needs Iran's oil and cannot afford to pick and choose its friends. It is this common interest in keeping relations on a low profile publicly that will prevent potentially critical governments, both Western and Eastern and both developed and developing, from totally understanding the more controversial aspects of the relationship.

David Andrews

(David Andrews)
Third Secretary

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193/11/128
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23

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA.

Nov 3 9 22 AM '75

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
LONDON, W. C. 2.

Files Nos.: 3/10/1/2/6
3/12/57

Memo No. 2946

27 October, 1975

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600.

193/11/128

IRAN : RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

We checked with the FCO whether there is any truth in the "Washington Post" report of 12 October that Iran is about to sign an agreement to buy 14,000 tons of uranium oxide from South Africa (WH.23721 refers).

2. The FCO (Wilmshurst, Energy Department) was not able to confirm the report but said that he would not be surprised if an agreement were signed, given the size of the Iranian nuclear power program. When we expressed some surprise that a more definitive answer could not be given by the FCO, given that Britain had just signed two agreements with Iran in the nuclear field (London savingram LH.41168 refers), Wilmshurst commented that participation in these agreements on the British side was limited almost entirely to Harwell. Wilmshurst appeared to share the thinking of ACDA that South Africa might ratify the non-proliferation treaty within the next twelve months (as requested by Washington, we did not refer to the ACDA view when we raised this matter).

3. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to the Australian Embassies at Washington, Tehran, Pretoria, and Vienna and to the Australian High Commission at Ottawa.

A. F. Dingle

(A. F. Dingle)
Minister

*Copies sent
to J10, W Europe,
CSA & Disarmament.*

J2.

6/11

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193/11/128 (2)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O. TR2383 SGP3/BMD
TOR 2222 16.10.75

O. TR2383 1155 16.10.75 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/2384

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/022 PRETORIA/001

FM. TEHRAN / FILE 221/4/3/8/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

IRAN-SOUTH AFRICA URANIUM CONTRACT

FOLLOWING PUBLICATION OF REPORTS IN WASHINGTON POST AND HERALD TRIBUNE, ACCOUNTS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING HERE OF MAJOR DEAL UNDER WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WILL SUPPLY IRAN WITH URANIUM AND IRAN WILL INVEST IN ENRICHMENT PLANT IN SOUTH AFRICA. ONE VERSION CLAIMS DEAL WILL PROVIDE IRAN WITH ALL ITS URANIUM NEEDS TILL END OF CENTURY.

2. SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUL-GENERAL CONFIRMS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF MAJOR NEGOTIATION BUT IS UNDER EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS TO GIVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION. ETEMAD, HEAD OF IRAN'S ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, HAS INFORMED PRESS THAT IRAN IS NEGOTIATING 'LARGE' IMPORTS WITH 'SEVERAL' COUNTRIES AND HAS ALREADY PURCHASED SOME URANIUM FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA.

3. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD SUPPLY FULL REQUIREMENTS FOR IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WHICH ENVISAGES UPWARDS OF TWENTY REACTORS. IT WOULD ALSO BE CONTRARY TO NORMAL IRANIAN PRACTICE TO PUT ALL THEIR EGGS IN ONE BASKET.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT MINERALS AND ENERGY
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
AAEC (S) T/T
PM AND C

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2- 0. TR2383 SGP3/BMD

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ACTION: EP/AME

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	STE	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	ASP
EUR	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	HOCI	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ER)	FAS(MFS)

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ИМЛЕВО СУБЕСВАН
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТЪТ НА ИНОСТРАННИТЕ ВЪВЕЖИ

PA 6/11/74
National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 193/11/128 PART 1



21

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/42
Memorandum No. 565

31 August, 1975.

The Secretary Foreign Affairs,
Department of ~~Education~~,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

193/11/128.

State Visit to Iran of North Yemen President

The thirty-three year old President of the Yemen Arab Republic, Ebrahim Mohammad al Hamdi, paid a three-day state visit to Iran from 27 - 29 August, at the invitation of the Shahanshah.

2. The visit, the first ever to Iran by a Head of State of Yemen, was marked by cordiality on both sides. The Shahanshah recalled the religious links which have existed between the two countries for 1,400 years. Al Hamdi praised Iran's prosperity and development programmes, and the Shahanshah's efforts to promote stability in the region.

3. At the conclusion of the visit, a joint communique was issued. In it, the two leaders agreed to co-operate in a wide range of economic, industrial and cultural fields, but particularly in television and telecommunications. The two leaders asserted that "long lasting peace and security in the region was impossible without the complete execution of all United Nations resolutions on Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied territories, the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people, and the prevention of any changes made in the Islamic aspects of Jerusalem."

C. H. White
C.H. WHITE
Third Secretary

Mr. [Signature]



20

CENTRAL REGISTER
D.E.A.
JUN 14 8 01 PM '73
NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA

IN REPLY QUOTE NO. 225/11
MEMORANDUM NO. 423

1 June 1973

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.


ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

193/11/128

SOUTH AFRICA/IRAN RELATIONS

...

Attached for your information is an interesting article (taken from the Pretoria News of 15 May 1973) reporting on the appointment of a South African Consul-General to Iran, and speculating on the growth of 'economic and strategic' links between the two countries.


(J.P. Sheppard)
First Secretary.

JPS:SCM



- Mr Jackson - Mr Galt
- F.
WEST RSM 22/6

SA forges strong ties with Iran

From Our Political Correspondent

CAPE TOWN. — The appointment of Lieutenant General C. A. (Pop) Fraser, General Officer commanding the Joint Combat Force, as South Africa's Consul General in Iran, has confirmed a growing belief that South Africa is forging strong economic and strategic links with the oil-rich Arab state.

General Fraser, who is highly respected in military circles, also has a known diplomatic ability and — most important — has had extensive personal contacts with Iran.

Not only is he known to have visited Iran twice in recent years — including a private visit last year — but he was also chosen to play host to the chief of the Iranian Navy, Admiral Farjollah Rassai, during his two-week goodwill visit to South Africa last year.

The appointment of General Fraser confirms the growing importance of the Iranian diplomatic contact.

Since the forging of diplomatic links with Iran late in 1970 there has been ample evidence of the developing relationship:

- South Africa and Iran have a long-term bilateral contract for the supply of essential crude oil and the National Iranian Oil Company has a known interest in marketing petrol in this country.

- More than 200 Iranians were employed in the development of the massive Sasolburg refinery.

- There have been a series of visits to South Africa — the country in which the Shah of Persia lived during the Second World War — recently.

*Iranians despise
Arabs.*

INWARD CABLEGRAM

19

PS 7

I. 93681

FROM

TOD 11.09.72...1810 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

TOR 12.09.72...0947 LT

UN 686

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 686 REPEATED WASHINGTON 157
PHNOM PENH OP202 PRETORIA OP203

UNGA: CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE - KHMER REPUBLIC AND
SOUTH AFRICA

YOUR 678.

COMPOSITION OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE IS GIVING A
PARTICULAR HEADACHE THIS YEAR TO THE AMERICANS AND THE
SECRETARIAT.

THE PROBLEM IS TO PROVIDE 1971 G.A. PRESIDENT MALIK WITH
A LIST WHICH FAIRLY REPRESENTS A CROSS-SECTION OF U.N.
ATTITUDES AND WHICH MIGHT AT THE SAME TIME RESIST A TWO-
FOLD CHALLENGE TO THE CREDENTIALS OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC AND
SOUTH AFRICA.

2. BOTH THE AMERICANS AND THE SECRETARIAT RECOGNISE THAT IN
THE LIGHT OF THE GEORGETOWN DEBACLE THERE COULD BE A SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO THE KHMER CREDENTIALS.

BUT THEY STILL BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A SUFFICIENT MAJORITY
IN THE ASSEMBLY TO OVERCOME THIS, EVEN IF NO POSITIVE DECISION
SHOULD EMERGE FROM THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE.

THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH THE DANGER OF AN IRRESISTIBLE
CHALLENGE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN CREDENTIALS, AND THIS CONCERN IS
MAINLY INFLUENCING THEIR APPROACH TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP.

3. STAVROPOULOUS HAS FELT BOUND TO ASK THE CHINESE IF THEY
WOULD LIKE TO BE ON THE COMMITTEE, AND THEY HAVE REPLIED
EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO SERVE.

THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT CHINA WOULD BE
SELECTED, NOR NEED IT AFFECT THE BALANCE OF THE COMMITTEE,
BUT IT COULD BE A COMPLICATION.

A MORE DELICATE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE
ASIAN OTHER THAN A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
AND THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE ONLY ASIAN MEMBER WHICH DID
NOT VOTE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA'S CREDENTIALS IN THE
ASSEMBLY LAST YEAR WAS IRAN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

Mr. R. H. ...
We should watch this
story I think
13/9

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

.2.

I. 93681

THE FEAR IS THAT NOMINATION OF IRAN TO THE COMMITTEE COULD BE SEEN BY THE OPPONENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA AS SUCH AN OBVIOUS LOADING DEVICE THAT THEY MIGHT IMMEDIATELY - AND SUCCESSFULLY - CHALLENGE MALIK'S SELECTION AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE ASSEMBLY.

4. IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO FIND ANOTHER ASIAN WHO WOULD SUPPORT THE KHMER CREDENTIALS.

BUT THE SAME ASIAN, ON PAST PERFORMANCE, COULD BE EXPECTED TO JOIN TWO COMMUNISTS AND TWO AFRICANS IN PRODUCING A NEGATIVE COMMITTEE VOTE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S CREDENTIALS.

IF SUCH A NEGATIVE REPORT WERE TO COME BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT THE ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN MAJORITY WOULD BRING SUCH PRESSURE TO BEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD FEEL UNABLE TO PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA WITH THE RULING THAT HAS GONE UNCHALLENGED IN THE PAST TWO SESSIONS - EVEN IF, AS A POLE, HE WERE DISPOSED TO MAKE IT.

5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE U.S. MISSION HAS THROWN THE WHOLE QUESTION TO WASHINGTON AND ASKED FOR GUIDANCE.

I HAVE HAD FROM STAVROPOULOUS HIMSELF TWO SOMEWHAT BYZANTINE SUGGESTIONS WHICH HE THINKS MIGHT CONCEIVABLY WORK.

THE FIRST IS THAT THE PHILIPPINES MIGHT BE ASKED TO SERVE ON THE COMMITTEE AND, IF AGREEABLE, MIGHT BE PERSUADED (PERHAPS BY THE UNITED STATES) TO VOTE IN THE COMMITTEE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CREDENTIALS ON TECHNICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, AND THEN IF NECESSARY SALVE ITS CONSCIENCE BY VOTING AGAINST THE COMMITTEE'S REPORT WITH THE OPPOSITION MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY.

HIS SECOND SUGGESTION IS THAT IN ORDER TO THWART ANY ATTEMPT TO DISPOSE OF THE CREDENTIALS QUESTION EARLY IN THE SESSION, SOUTH AFRICA (AND LIKEWISE THE KHMER REPUBLIC) SHOULD DELAY SUBMISSION OF CREDENTIALS UNTIL TOWARDS THE END OF THE SESSION, AS HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN DONE BY A NUMBER OF MEMBERS.

THIS SECOND SUGGESTION, WHICH IF EMPLOYED BY THE SECRETARIAT WITH JUDGEMENT AND DISCRETION COULD HOLD UP PRECIPITATE ACTION BY THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE, MAY WELL HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED.

6. I HAVE SOUNDED THE U.S. MISSION ON THE POSSIBLE USEFULNESS OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK AMONG THE KHMER REPUBLIC'S FRIENDS, AND MISSION AGREES THAT THESE MIGHT BE USEFUL., BUT THE IMMEDIATE PREOCCUPATION IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE.

.../3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

.3.

I. 93681

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN. AND DEPT. DEFENCE
J.I.O.
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA/UNIA

SEC DEP SEC(A) DEP SEC(B) PR MR BODY FAS(A) NA SA SEA
FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(10)
EP UNIA FAS (CL) LT FAS(MS)

BANGKOK BELGRADE DJAKARTA HONG KONG KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA
MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK (UN) OTTAWA PARIS SAIGON SEOUL
SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE WELLINGTON

18
Confidential
~~SECRET~~



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

TEHRAN

221/4/1

251/12/2

In reply quote No. 251/1/1/1.

Memorandum No. 243

Impress (S.P.)
Para 4. This memo has come with my
letter. I don't see what more there needs
way of procedure to you?

over 27/4

11th April, 1972.

*The Henderson: Hobbs; new paper are to be prepared
but we're pretty sure to be at this stage. I hope the
South African does not feel he is being encouraged to make the part of
The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.*

*Mr. Hecover
file 628/4*

QC 23/4

IRANIAN-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS AND THE INDIAN OCEAN.

I attach record of a conversation I had on 8th April
with Mr. Manuchehr Zelli, Under-Secretary (Political Affairs)
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The principal topic discussed was common concern
about the Indian Ocean which now appears to figure much more
in Iranian thinking about Australia. I took the opportunity
to indicate to Mr. Zelli the reservations we had about being
grouped with South Africa. This was in accordance with the
instructions in your telegram 7 of 5th January, 1972.

*Mr. Alexander
(S.A. 1)*

*over 27/4
in Henderson
in Aham*

3. As I see it, the Iranians will not admit to any in-
consistency in supporting the Ceylonese peace zone resolution
on one hand and discussing possible co-operation, even of a
defence nature, with the South Africans on the other. They
would justify all lines of activity as being directed towards
the common objective of peace and security in the area.
However, you will note Mr. Zelli's claim that all moves on
Iran's part in relation to the Indian Ocean were still new
and tentative.

4. For our own part, without further background, I find
it difficult to take discussion much further. For this
reason I sought guidance in my memoranda 589 of 4th November,
1971 (mainly in relation to South Africa), 32 of 13th January
and 181 of 9th March, to none of which have I so far had a
direct response.

*6
26/4*

5. The paper enclosed with your circular memorandum of
28th February (74 to Tehran) makes a comment in paragraph
10 about Iran's involvement with the Soviet Union, which we
do not quite understand. It is true that Iran has more
cordial surface relations with the U.S.S.R. than in the past
and considerable two-way commercial commitments (the gas
line, steel mill, machine tool factories, non-oil exports
etc.) Politically, however, Iran continues to watch the

*193/1152
193/1130
193/171
→ 193/1128
193/1101*


~~SECRET~~
Confidential

SECRET

2.

USSR with a great deal of caution. We have reason to believe that recent developments, the Soviet treaty with India and, to an even greater extent, that signed last week with Iraq, are causing concern to the Shah and his Government, and disposing them to look around for others who might similarly be worried about Soviet penetration into and beyond the Persian Gulf. This is a likely explanation for the references to common interests with Australia and South Africa made by the Shah and others on a number of occasions in the past year or so, which I have been reporting.

6. As regards South African relations with Iran and in particular my memorandum 589 referred to above, the South African Consul General told me this week that he expected to have a naval officer, with some cover designation, on his staff by next month.


(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. M. Zelli (Under-Secretary Political Affairs
On Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
8th April, 1972.
Officers Present Mr. F.B. Hall (Ambassador)

Subject: IRANIAN-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS: INDIAN OCEAN: PERSIAN GULF.

IRANIAN-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS.

I explained to Mr. Zelli that I had no special instructions to call, but had not seen him for some time and wished to take the opportunity for a general discussion.

2. First of all, I referred to the reference by the Foreign Minister in press interview last month to the establishment of a resident mission in Canberra. Mr. Zelli said that it was hoped to do this within the Iranian financial year just started. The Iranian Government considered that relations with Australia had got away to a good start in the past few years and justified a mission in Australia. The exact timing would depend on budgetary factors.

3. We spoke of the commercial side and imbalance of trade. Mr. Zelli reminded me of a discussion he had had with the Commercial Counsellor recently and of the standing Australian offer to assist Iran in investigating its market prospects in Australia. He confirmed that Iran did not like such trade imbalances as existed between us and that this could affect the attitude to further increases in Australian imports. I agreed that it could be to our benefit to assist Iran in any efforts it made to reduce the gap.

4. I went on then to mention our other efforts to promote contacts, such as the current cultural tour of Australia by an Iranian professor, the increasing number of Colombo Plan awards in a variety of fields (including places on our foreign service training course in which he was interested), and placement of Iranian scholarship holders. In all these endeavours, I thought there could be benefit from the presence of an Iranian mission on the spot, especially for student welfare. Mr. Zelli agreed.

INDIAN OCEAN.

5. I introduced this subject by saying that, despite the above considerations, the security of the Indian Ocean probably formed the principal connecting interest between Australia and Iran. We were always ready to continue the dialogue on this subject.

Prepared by

F.B. Hall
(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6. First of all, I wanted to take the opportunity to mention that the Australian Government had reservations about the indications from one source or another (I mentioned Prime Minister Hoveyda's remarks to Mr. Lynch in December last year) that Iran grouped South Africa with Australia for purposes of collaboration over the Indian Ocean. It was not that we did not have good general relations with South Africa but felt any public show of collaboration would be impracticable and ineffective because of the likely reaction of other littoral countries. Relations with South Africa were in fact a matter of domestic political controversy in Australia.

7. Mr. Zelli replied that too much may have been read into remarks here. Iran's direct concern with the Indian Ocean was still new and tentative, and no precise policies or attitudes had been formulated. The Iranian Government was simply looking at all possibilities and suggestions, public and private, which could assist towards the objective of security of the Indian Ocean for peaceful use.

8. He asked if we held bilateral discussions with South Africa on the Indian Ocean. I said we had many points of contact with South Africa in trade and so forth, but that I did not know what might have been said on this particular subject. I thought the Australian Government would have difficulties about taking the initiative.

9. Mr. Zelli emphasised that Iran did not necessarily deal with these matters in public, indicating perhaps that it too had to watch the reaction elsewhere in Asia. He then referred to a non-governmental seminar to take place in London in late May (he described it as a "private international conference"), under sponsorship, inter alia, by New York University's "National Strategic Programme". Georgetown University, Washington, was also connected in some way. The topic was "Economic and Political Developments in relation to Sea Power along routes from the Indian Ocean." I gathered that, in addition to Britain, other European countries and Japan, of the littoral countries, Iran, Australia, Indonesia and South Africa were being invited. Iran would send a professor from Tehran University and was, I understood, very interested to take advantage of the seminar despite its ostensibly non-governmental and academic nature.

10. In further conversation, Mr. Zelli emphasised that Iran was not over-concerned about developments in the Indian Ocean so far. Certainly the Soviet Union as a Great Power with global interests had a right to a naval presence in all oceans. Nevertheless Iran was watching closely and ready to talk to other like-minded countries at any time. He felt Australia was such a country, in which Iran could repose "trust" for the purpose of such discussions.

11. I replied that our attitude to the Indian Ocean question was similar. We were not in a panic about the Soviet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

build-up but regarded it as something to be watched carefully. I went on to say that we for our part welcomed British and United States' concern and had offered them use of our West coast facilities. The Five Power arrangements in and around Malaysia/Singapore were also relevant.

12. In reply to my question about the Ceylonese peace zone resolution, Mr. Zelli said Iran, in voting affirmatively, wished to show its support for the principle involved. I explained that we too favoured the objective of elimination of Great Power rivalry, but had found the resolution impracticable. The difference therefore was one of approach.

PERSIAN GULF.

13. When I went on to enquire whether Iran saw the current Soviet naval visits to Iraq as an extension of the Indian Ocean problem, Mr. Zelli replied in somewhat tight lipped manner that Iran was following the development of Soviet relations with Iraq with keen attention. He did not volunteer more, but confirmed that Iran continued to regard the Gulf as international waters in which Soviet ships, as well as those of other nations, had a right to move.

14. I asked whether there was a parallel between the position in the Straits of Malacca and that in the Straits of Hormuz, which were about the same width. (A recent press article here suggested that the circumstances were very similar.) Mr. Zelli refused to be drawn on any thoughts Iran might have, perhaps in collaboration with Oman, of developing action parallel to that of Indonesia and Malaysia. He did, however, give me the impression that use of the Straits of Hormuz, in relation to recent developments in the Law of the Sea, was under examination, and spoke of great danger to the whole Gulf of oil pollution from tanker wrecks or collisions. I mentioned the importance we attached to the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference in the matter of passage through narrow straits.

CONFIDENTIAL

Basement

18/1

Tehran Savingsgram

No 2 of 4 4/3/72

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

193/11/128

INWARD SAVINGGRAM

19. Later in the month, the Shah publicly warned Iraq not to push its "policy of provocation" any further, but the situation seems to have eased for the time being and resettlement of those expelled is proceeding.

Soviet Union

20. On 30th January the Minister for Finance, Jamshid Amuzegar went to Moscow to discuss joint projects to be developed in Iran under a fifteen year economic co-operation agreement initialled recently. In addition to a second hydro-electric complex on the River Aras and a dam on the River Atak in the north east of Iran, Mr. Amuzegar is said to be seeking Soviet participation in housing projects.

South Africa

21. On 20th January Reza Shah's former residence in Johannesburg was inaugurated as a museum by the Iranian Minister for Culture and brother-in-law of the Shah, who went to South Africa for the purpose. Reza Shah, the present Shah's father, lived in Johannesburg from his abdication in 1941 to his death in 1944. The Tehran Kayhan newspaper reported that "the warm relations enjoyed by Pretoria and Tehran, most notably in the fields of culture and economics since consular missions were established in 1970, were much in evidence at the inauguration".

Bulgaria

22. The Bulgarian Agriculture Minister Valkan Shopov signed an agricultural agreement in Tehran with the Iranian Agriculture Minister Mansur Rouhani on 1st February. The agreement will enable Iran to utilise the services of Bulgarian experts in dry farming techniques in cereal and meat production. The agreement also covers grape and tobacco production.

3rd February, 1972.

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Boomerang
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→ 193/11/128
(16)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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TOD 05.01.72...1959 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN...007

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE
PRETORIA...0006

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...040

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON...100 (FOR INFORMATION)

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED TEHERAN 007, REPEATED PRETORIA 006, WASHINGTON 040,
LONDON 100 (FOR INFORMATION)

FOR HALL

INDIAN OCEAN

YOUR 708

PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA'S REFERENCE TO A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST
BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, IRAN. AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND
HIS NOTION OF A TRIANGLE WITH A SOUTHERN BASE AND NORTHERN APEX,
HAVE CAUSED US SOME CONCERN.

2. WHILE WE WISH TO DEVELOP A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN, AND REGARD THE
INDIAN OCEAN AS A PROMISING TOPIC IN THIS RESPECT, WE WOULD NOT
WANT TO GIVE THE IRANIANS ANY REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT WE SUPPORT THE
PARTICULAR IDEA OF A TRIPARTITE APPROACH AS OUTLINED BY MR. HOVEYDA.
IN OUR VIEW, THE PROPOSED GROUPING WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE, INEFFECTIVE
AND CERTAIN - BECAUSE OF SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION - TO ALIENATE
LITTORAL STATES, ESPECIALLY THE AFRICAN STATES. YOU SHOULD MAKE THESE
POINTS CLEARLY AS OPPORTUNITY OFFERS.

3. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE INDIAN OCEAN WILL BE FORWARDED BY BAG.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

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FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
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PM'S

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ACTION: SA

SEC DEP SEC(A) PR SLA A/FAS(A) NA SA SEA A/FAS(PW) PC EAME
FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(10) EP UNIA SAS(LGL)
LTB UNL FAS(MS)

ANKARA DARESSALAAM DJAKARTA ISLAMABAD KUALA LUMPUR MOSCOW
NEW DELHI NEW YORK (UN) PRETORIA RANGOON SINGAPORE COLOMBO
BANGKOK NAIROBI CAPETOWN

193/11/128
(15)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CMB4

I.127493

FROM

TOD 15.12.71...1617 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHERAN

TOR 16.12.71...0141 LT

708 CONFIDENTIAL

IRANO-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS

MINISTER FOR LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE PAID COURTESY CALL ON PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN YESTERDAY BEFORE DEPARTURE AND PRESENTED GIFT FROM AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

2. MR HOVEYDA WAS IN FRIENDLY AND EXPANSIVE MOOD AND SPOKE WITHOUT PROMPTING ON POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN IRANO-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS. MAIN POINTS WERE

A) COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, IRAN AND SOUTH AFRICA (HE SPOKE OF TRIANGLE WITH SOUTHERN BASE AND NORTH-ERN APEX), NOW EMPHASISED BY RUSSIAN-CHINESE RIVALRY LYING BEHIND INDO-PAKISTAN HOSTILITIES

B) EXPANSION OF TRADE. HE SPOKE OF LONG RANGE NECESSITY TO IMPORT AUSTRALIAN MEAT AND DAIRY PRODUCE. LOCAL PRODUCTION COULD NOT MATCH RISING CONSUMPTION

C) AUSTRALIA SHOULD ENTER INTO JOINT VENTURES IN IRAN IN FIELDS WHERE IT HAD SPECIAL SKILLS. HE MENTIONED WOOL PROCESSING AND MEAT PACKING

D) HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE LARGE NUMBERS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS GOING TO AUSTRALIA FOR PRACTICAL TRAINING.
EUROPE AND AMERICA NO LONGER HAD THE PIONEER SPIRIT WHICH HE BELIEVED AUSTRALIA COULD INCULCATE AND WAS NEEDED HERE.

E) DESPATCH TO AUSTRALIA OF WORKERS TO ACQUIRE SKILLS AND RETURN ON EUROPEAN+GUEST WORKER+ PATTERN

3. PRIME MINISTER ASKED IRANIAN MINISTER OF LABOUR, WHO WAS PRESENT TO FOLLOW UP, AND I MAY HEAR MORE, ESPECIALLY ON POINTS (D) AND (E) WHICH IN ANY CASE TOUCH ON SUBJECTS RAISED BEFORE

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON OUR INDIAN OCEAN INTERESTS IN CONTEXT MENTIONED WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY (IN PARTICULAR IN MEMORANDUM 589 OF 4TH NOVEMBER 1971). IRANIAN VIEWS AS EXPRESSED SEEM HARD TO RECONCILE

...2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.127493

WITH THEIR REPORTED CO-SPONSORSHIP OF CEYLONESE RESOLUTION
IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

5. MR HOVEYDA CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE TO MR LYNCH
THAT PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA WOULD FIND TIME ON A FUTURE
TOUR ABROAD TO VISIT IRAN

HALL

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
MIN AND DEPT P I
TREASURER AND TREASURY
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: SA DP

SEC DEP SEC(A) DEP SEC(B) PR SLA FAS(A) NA SA SEA
FAS(PW) PC EAME DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(10) EP
UNIA SAS(LGL) LTB UNL FAS(MS)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from Pretoria memo. 341 of 8/10/71.

(F) → 193/11/128
21/10

14

-2-

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Africa "to see for themselves". South Africa declined to accept such a mission, but invited the President himself, or one or two members of his government to visit South Africa. Clearly the South Africans would welcome a full-scale State visit, like that of Dr. Banda, of Malawi, but would not tolerate "fact-finding missions" of the Diggs type which appear to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs. Amin subsequently announced that he would not pursue his request and the matter is now apparently at an end.

(iii) Joint South African/United Kingdom Naval Exercises.

The chief of South Africa's navy, Vice-Admiral H.H. Biermann, has announced that South Africa and Britain will engage in joint naval exercises in South African waters from 4th October to 3rd November. The exercises are an extension of those held in August last year, and were welcomed here as recognition of the need for international co-operation in the face of growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

(iv) State President to visit Iran.

The State President of South Africa, Mr. Fouché, and Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, have been invited to Iran this month to attend the celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire. The invitation follows the exchange of consular missions between the two countries, the successful visit of an Iranian trade mission from 15th to 18th September, and various other signs of working towards a close and friendly relationship between the two countries. (Our memorandum 140 of 29th July, 1971, refers).

(v) Visits to Europe of Bantustan Leaders.

The African leaders of the Transkei, Zululand and Tsuanaland left this week on an official visit to Great Britain and West Germany. Their apparent treatment as potential heads of government by overseas governments is seen here as conferring a welcome degree of international acceptance and respectability on South Africa's policy of eventual independence for the Bantustans.

In Britain the leaders have been received by Prince Philip, the Lord Mayor of London, members of the South African Embassy, the South Africa Foundation and the U.K.-S.A. Trade Associations. They have been to tourist attractions in London and will also visit Birmingham, where they will study aspects of a high density non-white population living in a 'white area.' Early in their visit they received a detailed two hour briefing from Southern Africa experts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on practical aspects of decolonization of the former High Commission territories of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho.

As yet, no details of their program in West Germany next month have been released here.

Jenny Turnbull

(Jenny Turnbull)
Third Secretary

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139

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA

In reply quote No. 225/11; 121/4

Memorandum No. 140

29th July, 1971.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Handwritten:
Mr. ~~McGregor~~ } info.
Mr. ~~Gregg~~ }
→ (F) 193/11/128.
RC 11/6.

JOINT VENTURE WITH IRAN

The Natref Refinery at Sasolburg is due to reach full production in early 1972. The R80-million (\$A.100-million) project is designed to produce one fifth of South Africa's petroleum needs before the end of 1971 and is regarded as an important part of South Africa's strategic oil supply system.

2. The crude oil for the project comes from two partners, the National Iranian Oil Company (an Iranian government organisation) and the International Total group.

3. Natref itself is owned by Sasol (South African) 52.5%; Total 30%; and National Iranian Oil Company, 17.5%. Temporarily, the N.I.O.C. has conceded its processing rights to Sasol.

4. Construction of the refinery has been in progress for two years. During the early stages many sub-contractors employed artisans from overseas, including 300 Iranians and 100 Germans.

5. The Natref project has generated an increasing awareness of Iran in South African official circles. Consuls-General were exchanged between the two countries at the end of 1970 and economic reporters feel the climate for increased trade between the two countries is "very favourable". SAFTO (the South African Foreign Trade Organisation) has published articles on Iran pointing out major mining opportunities for South Africans in Iran and encouraging interest in joint ventures.

2/*****

→ *Handwritten signature:* [Signature]
1984/5/9
Chelton 12/8

6. SAFTO also pointed out Iran's heavy dependence on imports of pharmaceuticals and machinery and equipment for agriculture, food processing, transport, heavy construction, refrigeration, air-conditioning and electricity generation, with the implication that these all provided openings for South African firms.

7. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Teheran for information.

Jenny Turnbull

(Jenny Turnbull)
Third Secretary

jt/ejo

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(12)

CENTRAL
D.E.A.
JUL 20 4 03 PM '71
NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/41
Memorandum No 352

12th July, 1971.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

193/11/128

IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

In a recent interview with a representative of the Paris-based newspaper "Jeune Afrique", the Shah spoke of Iran's developing relations with African countries, including the proposed exchange of diplomatic relations with Senegal. He was asked whether the country's links with South Africa would endanger development of relations with Black Africa. The answer and following question and answer were as follows:-

Mr Clark
Copies to Mr
Threlkeld &
Mr Kuip, pls
by 29.7

- A. I don't see why it should. Our foreign policy is independent and we never mix trade with politics. When all the world trades with South Africa I don't see why we shouldn't. This, of course, does not prevent us from condemning with vehemence and vigour that country's racial policy. South Africa, I believe, is a member of the United Nations. If it were excluded from it the problem would be different. Certain Black African countries also wish to establish a dialogue with South Africa.
- Q. An attempt is being made but it is far from a unanimous move.
- A. Each country is free to decide how to conduct its own foreign policy the way it likes. In any case Iran has always condemned racialism.

2. You are aware from earlier reports that the South Africans have established their Consulate-General in Tehran and the Consul-General is active and much in social evidence. It is certainly true that he operates as far as protocol permits as a head of diplomatic mission. The local diplomatic list gives him a courtesy title of Excellency.

PLEASE DESTROY DUPLICATE COPY
AND ATTACHMENT IF NOT REQUIRED

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
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2.

3. Two months ago the Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company, Dr. M. Egbal, former Prime Minister and one of the most important figures in this country, visited South Africa with considerable publicity to attend the inauguration of the joint Irano-South African oil refinery, in the construction of which a large number of Iranian technicians participated. He was accompanied by Senator Taher Ziai, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who had discussions on other commercial possibilities.

4. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Pretoria.


(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

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193/A/128 (11)

CENTRAL RECORDS
O D.E.A.

NOV 23 2 17 PM '70

NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/41

Memorandum No. 636

11th November, 1970

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Iran's Relations with South Africa

Please refer to our memorandum 624 of 11th November, and Pretoria's unnumbered cable of 16th November about public presentation of the establishment of consular ties between South Africa and Iran.

Mr. T. B. ROSE
2. Following their earlier denials that diplomatic relations would be established between the two countries, the Iranian press reported on 15th November that relations had been established at consular level. A Foreign Ministry official was quoted as saying that the newly established relations were not of a diplomatic nature and that the decision to open an Iranian consulate in Johannesburg had been taken as a result of recent growth in the number of Iranian workers in the South African oil industry (involved in the Iranian-South African joint venture oil refinery).

3. Another reason given for the establishment of the mission was Iran's wish to preserve the house in which Reza Shah the Great spent his last days following his exile from Iran.

4. Iran has come under some attack from Iraq for exchanging missions with South Africa. The press reports made clear that Lebanon had already established "links with Pretoria" on a consular level.

5. Iran's opposition to racial discrimination was reiterated.

6. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Australian Embassy, Pretoria (OP.134)

D. H. Reese
(D. H. Reese)
Second Secretary

Copy passed to Mr. THWAITES

→ Mr. STUART

RESTRICTED



⑤ 193/11/128

⑩

RELATIONS WITH IRAN

13. On 12th November, the Department of Foreign Affairs announced that South Africa and Iran had agreed to establish relations at Consulates-General level.

(10)

⑦ 1d3/11/158

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24

(F) 193/11/128

(9)

Baringham 58/70 from Cape Town,
11 Nov. 1970


7. Iran:

Fourie confirmed that South African Consul-General (Oxley) was already established in Teheran and that Iranian representative was expected in Pretoria "within a few days." He did not offer any explanation of surprising lack of public announcement concerning these appointments.

Mr. Cutts'
Conversation
with Roreya Re. Fourie,
10 Nov. 1970.

CUTTS

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry: 193/11/128
South African relations
and
and not for
of members

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LDS3

I. 121830

FROM

TOD 17.11.70..1150 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA

TOR 17.11.70..2130 LT

392

UNCLASSIFIED

IRAN. SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS.

FIRST IRANIAN CONSUL-GENERAL (DR. AHMED TEHRANI) ARRIVED IN SOUTH AFRICA NOVEMBER 13 WITH THREE STAFF MEMBERS. (TWO MORE ARE EXPECTED). ON ARRIVAL DR TEHRANI REFERRED TO POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASED TRADE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND TO 'SENTIMENTAL TIES' STEMMING FROM ASYLUM IN SOUTH AFRICA ENJOYED BY SHAH MIRZ RIZA DURING WAR YEARS.

IN REPORTING DR TEHRANI'S ARRIVAL PRESS ALSO MENTIONED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN CONSUL-GENERAL (OXLEY) HAD OPENED HIS MISSION IN TEHERAN NEARLY A MONTH AGO. THERE HAD BEEN NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER.

ABOVE INFORMATION ALREADY CABLED TO TEHERAN.

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18/11/70
Mr. T. H. H. H.

21/3/68

INWARD CABLEGRAM

TO: DIRECTOR GENERAL
FROM: AMERICAN EMBASSY
SUBJECT: [illegible]

URGENT
[illegible text follows, appearing to be a cable message body]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

NAA: A1838, 193/11/128 PART 1

National Archives of Australia

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 121830

LDS3

TOD 17.11.70..1150 LT

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PRETORIA

392

UNCLASSIFIED

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Mr. L. K. 470
20/11/70
Mr. J. K. 11725

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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True love
20/11/70


CENTRAL REGISTRY
O D.E.A.

Nov 16 4 06 PM '70

NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

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(6)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

In reply quote No. 221/5/41

Memorandum No. 624

11th November, 1970.

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

193/11/128

IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

Please refer to our memorandum 535 of 30th September about the opening of consular relations with South Africa. The South Africans have wasted no time as their Consul General arrived in Tehran a week ago and we have already had a call from a member of his staff seeking guidance on housing and administrative aspects. According to the latter, there would be a staff of five, including two "Trade Consuls".

2. Although the press has not so far mentioned the arrival of the South Africans, there may have been some undercover enquiries and speculation. To all events the Foreign Ministry last week felt obliged to deny reports that Iran and South Africa were discussing the establishment of direct diplomatic relations. One press account said that as Iran was strongly opposed to apartheid, there was no possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa.

3. The above illustrates well the difficulties of trying to be on both sides of the fence at once.

4. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to Pretoria.

F.B. Hall
(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

MR STUART

24/11
Mr Treflowe

22/11/70
Mr Treflowe

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CENTRAL REGISTRY
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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
CAPE TOWN

225/11

In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. C.261

16th October, 1970.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

193/11/128
193/2/1

IRANIAN WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Reference is made to Tehran memorandum No. 535 (~~221/5/41~~) of 30th September, 1970.

Mr S
S. V. A. P. S.

2. On 30th September a group of 114 qualified workmen from Iran - the first of a total of 250 - who have been contracted to work on the construction of a R60m. oil refinery at Sasolburg, were reported by the local press to have arrived in South Africa.

3. Their acceptance as whites appeared to have been quite natural and normal, and there have been no reports of adverse public reaction on racial or other grounds. On the contrary, the workers were apparently very well received and there has been a great deal of favourable publicity. The only reference to the racial question came from a Government spokesman who had been asked to comment. He was reported to have replied evasively that the Iranians, being visitors, fell outside the Group Areas Act and similar legislation.

4. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Tehran.

F. C. Ness

(F. C. Ness)
First Secretary

RESTRICTED

fcn/mjm

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

193/11/128 (4)

LDS3

I. 121830

FROM

TOD 17.11.70..1150 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA

TOR 17.11.70..2130 LT

392

UNCLASSIFIED

IRAN. SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS.

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ABOVE INFORMATION ALREADY CABLED TO TEHERAN.

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(F) 193 / 11 / 128
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I. 121349

FROM

TOD 16.11.70...1200 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA

TOR 16.11.70...2038 LT

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IRAN - SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

FIRST IRANI GENERAL (DR AHMED TEHRANI) ARRIVED IN SOUTH AFRICA NOVEMBER 13 WITH THREE STAFF. (TWO MORE ARE EXPECTED) ON ARRIVAL DR TEHRANI REFERRED TO POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASED TRADE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND TO 'SENTIMENTAL TIES' STEMMING FROM ASYLUM IN SOUTH AFRICA ENJOYED BY SHAH MIRZ RIZA DURING WAR YEARS.

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RESTRICTED (2)

193/11/128

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
ATHENS.

415/5

221/5/17

In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. 631

30th October 1970

20/11/70

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Record of Conversation

Attached for your information are copies of a record of conversation with the South African Ambassador (Lindhorst) on 20th October 1970.

2. Copies are being forwarded to Teheran and Pretoria.

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
11/11

H. Gilchrist
H. Gilchrist
Ambassador

RESTRICTED

12/11
Mr. Layton

copy passed to European

the [signature]
Please place copies of
R.O.C. on S.A./IRAN
FILE (OR IRAN/S.A.) re
para 6 & on S.A.
Foreign Policy of MFA
re para 7
12/11

RESTRICTED

415/5
File No. 221/5/17

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, ATHENS.

Record of Conversation with South African Ambassador (Lindhorst)

on Tuesday, 20th October 1970

Officers Present Australian Ambassador (Gilchrist)

MAIN SUBJECT(S): South African External Relations, Greek-South African Relations,
Iranian-South African Relations.

The new South African Ambassador, Paul Lindhorst, a career officer with previous service as Consul-General in Beirut and in posts at Nairobi and Elizabethville (Lubumbashi), made his initial courtesy call. I had previously known him in Pretoria.

2. After speaking about his predecessor's neglect of the South African Embassy residence in Athens, and about the latter's inclination to show a rather low profile in his last post in the service, Lindhorst said that relations between Greece and South Africa had been satisfactory since the present military government had taken over. In 1963, by contrast, the Greek Government had strongly and openly attacked the South African Government. After a long delay, a young Greek diplomat had been posted to South Africa as Ambassador by the present Government.

3. Lindhorst compared the United States' probable resumption of arms deliveries to Greece with the British Conservative Government's desire to sell arms to South Africa. (I felt unable to go far with him on this; NATO is a much tighter alliance than the Simonstown Agreement).

4. Lindhorst described the recent United Nations General Assembly resolution against anti-colonialism as outrageous. He had noted with regret that Greece had voted for it.

5. Asked about the South African community in Greece, he said that there was a large floating community of Greek-South Africans, or South African Greeks, who tended to be good South Africans when in South Africa, and even better Greeks when in Greece, although they gave his Embassy occasional consular problems. The Embassy, he mentioned, was interested in keeping Greek immigration to South Africa going.

6. Lindhorst said that South Africa was about to establish a Consulate-General in Teheran. This followed a visit by two senior Iranian diplomats to South Africa a short while ago. The new Consul-General would be A.J. Oxley (who is well known to me). Although designated Consul-General, Oxley would have the career rank of Ambassador, and would perform a diplomatic function as far as local conditions allowed. For obvious reasons, Lindhorst said, some countries found it easier to accept South African consular representatives than diplomatic ones; hence South Africa had set up a number of Consulates-General which were, in fact, diplomatic posts.

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7. Speaking of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lindhorst said that its permanent head, Brand Fourie, was continuing to follow his own very personal style of administration, confiding little in his colleagues and keeping the reins of power very closely to himself. (Please protect Lindhorst).

(Report prepared by)

H. Gilchrist

(Hugh Gilchrist)

Copies to:

Teheran
Pretoria

RESTRICTED

CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.E.A.

OCT 6 11 16 AM

NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

RESTRICTED

①

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TEHRAN

221/5/41

In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. 535

193/11/128

30th September, 1970.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

IRAN: RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

193/2/1

Please refer to Cape Town's memorandum C.177
of 9th September, 1970.

2. The local press has reported the imminent departure for South Africa, by Iran Air Aircraft, of about 280 skilled workers from Iran, including plumbers, electricians and welders, to assist in the construction of an oil refinery being put up jointly by the National Iranian Oil Company and South African interests.

3. The local English translation service added, as a footnote, that under South African racial laws, Iranians, being "Aryan", are classified as white.

4. There has still been no official announcement of the appointment of an Iranian Consul General, but, according to a story, he will live in the former residence of the exiled Reza Shah, which has been bought by the Iranian Government. An Asian colleague speculated to me yesterday that the Iranian Consul General, who would have the rank of Ambassador, might be accredited elsewhere in Africa. If by this he meant African States other than immediate neighbours of South Africa, this would seem most unlikely.

5. Copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to Cape Town.

Mr. Styant

(F.B. Hall)
Ambassador.

[Signature]

→ Regent's

Mr. Time low
to see

*Pls open a new file
Iran rels with South Africa*

CHECKED
9/10/70

193/11/128

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→ 2/8. Styant